Why 313? A peek into history with the caveat that history is written by the victors – hence fact and fiction intermingle to make the winner look supreme.
AD 624: The Quraysh first threatened the Madinans, in a letter addressed to ‘Adbullah ibn Ubayy ibn Salul, to kill their males and enslave their females unless they expelled Prophet Mohammed from Madina.
It was, at last, at the beginning of 624, two years after the Hijra that a large caravan of the Quraysh, escorted by no more than 40 security guards en route to Makka from Syria, arrived at a place within reach of the Muslims. Fearing that the Muslims would stop their caravan and restore their usurped goods, Abu Sufyan, the leader of the caravan, rushed a messenger to Makka and sought help and reinforcements.
This caused an uproar through Makka. The leading chiefs of the Quraysh decided to wage war on the Prophet and about 1000 fighters moved out of Makka with much pomp and show. They had decided to deal a crushing blow to the rising power of the Muslims.
Prophet Mohammad realized that if an effective step was not taken right then, the preaching of Islam might suffer a blow from which it might be very difficult for it to recover. Had the Quraysh taken the initiative and launched an attack on Madina, it might have put an end to the existence of the small Muslim community in that town. (BuA: And the end of Islam as we know it today – and an effective lesson to Indian military planners about the way they sat as Pakistan built up nuclear weapons and now tweaking US money to buy weapons to gain advantage over India – how long will India wait?)
The Makkan army consisted of 1000 fighters, including 600 soldiers in coats of mail, and 200 cavalry. Against the force of the Makkan army, the Muslim army was made up of 313 fighters. Of these, 86 were Emigrants and the rest, the Helpers. (BuA: Hence the reference to the number 313)
The two armies finally encountered each other at Badr. (BuA: Note reference to Badr in another terror outfit: Al-Badr)
Even though the Muslims were outnumbered 3 to 1, heavy downpour the night before the battle was to the advantage of the Muslims, who were on a higher ground. In the lower part of the valley, where the Quraysh army was stationed, the ground had turned marshy.
The battle began. In the first frontline of the Quraysh were ‘Utba ibn Rabi‘a and his brother, Shayba, and his son, Walid. They challenged the Muslims to single combat. Three young men of the Helpers went forward against them. ‘We will not fight with the farmers and spherherds of Madina,’ ‘Utba shouted out of an arrogance which would cause their perishing. This was, in fact, what Prophet Mohammad expected. He ordered ‘Ali, Hamza and ‘Ubayda ibn Harith to go forth for single combat. Hamza advanced against ‘Utba and killed him. ‘Ali killed Walid with two blows. ‘Ubayda, who was old, marched against Shayba. They exchanged blows, and the sharp edge of Shayba’s sword struck ‘Ubayda’s knee and cut it. However Hamza and ‘Ali rescued him from Shayba. They killed Shayba and carried ‘Ubayda away.
The Quraysh were shocked at the beginning of the war. The Quraysh, who had exulted in their power, suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the ill-equipped Muslims. Seventy of the Quraysh were killed. Almost all the leaders of the Quraysh, including Abu Jahl, Walid ibn Mughira, ‘Utba ibn Rabi‘ah, ‘As ibn Sa‘id, Umayyah ibn Khalaf, and Nawfal ibn Khuwaylid were killed.
Another seventy of the Quraysh were taken as war prisoners. The Muslims were permitted to accept ransom from them. Prophet Mohammad released some of them in return for ransom, and the others who knew how to read and write were enslaved on the condition that they should teach the unlettered Muslims how to read and write.
Such treatment of the captives proved very beneficial for the Muslims. For those people who had expected execution welcomed the chance to pay ransom and paid it. Second, the rate of literacy in Madina was very low, and, in order to propagate Islam, the Muslims had to know how to read and write. Besides, the Muslims had to be culturally superior to the polytheists. Third, those who were kept in Madina to teach the Muslims how to read and write would be able to learn Islam better than before and find the opportunity to be in close contact with the Muslims. This was certain to soften their hearts toward Islam and accelerate their conversion, together with that of their families. Fourth, the families and relatives of those captives had despaired of their lives. But, when they saw them before them unexpectedly, their enmity to Islam was considerably lessened or broken.
The decisive victory gained at Badr made Islam a force to reckon with across all of Arabia, and many hardened hearts were inclined to accept the message of Islam.
Brigade 313 is the coalition of five jihadi organizations that have been the to-go groups for most of Pakistan-based terror operations during last decade (coalition of Lashkar-e-Tayba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkatul Jihad al-Islami, Harkatul Mujahideen al-Alami and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi). Brigade 313 members have been known to be working with Bin-Laden as well as the Pakistani spy agency (ISI) and the Pakistani military.
Brigade 313 & Laskhar al Zil
Brigade 313 is responsible for 26/11. I think there is a close connection between Brigade 313 and Lashkar al Zil or the SHADOW ARMY.
Long War Journal reports : The presence of the Shadow Army has been evident for some time, as there have been numerous reports of joint operations between the Taliban, al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, Hizb-i-Islami, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami, and other terror groups. (NOTE: Same terror modules that make up Brigade 313). “The type of masks worn and the tennis shoes are also strong indicators that these fighters "are non-Afghan fighters," an expert on the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan said. "Those types of masks I have seen, and they are always on the Pakistani side of the border," the expert said. "The tennis shoes and socks are a big indicator that they are non-Afghan fighters, probably Pakistanis or Arab/Central Asian fighters."
Ilyas Kashmiri created Brigade 313. Kashmiri was also an elite commando of SSG (Pakistan) . He was also Pervez Musharraf’s blue eyed boy and received a cash reward of Rs 100,000 for brutally beheading an Indian soldier and bringing his head as a trophy for the then General.
On February 25, 2000, Indian Army troops allegedly crossed the Line of Control and killed 14 people in Nakial in Pakistan occupied Kashmir.
On the morning of February 26, Kashmiri conducted a guerrilla operation against the Indian Army in the Nakial sector. He crossed the LoC with 25 fighters from his 313 brigade, surrounded an Indian Army bunker and threw grenades inside. He also kidnapped an injured Indian Army officer who he later killed brutally.
He returned to Pakistan with the Indian Army officer's head in his bag and presented it to senior Pakistan army officers. President Musharraf, who was also then the army chief, awarded his Rs 100,000 for this action.
The Indian side of this sordid saga:
Indian Express reports: "Indian Army records show that the man who was beheaded in 2000 was Sepoy Bhausaheb Maruti Talekar of the 17 Maratha Light Infantry (MLI). While Indian troops in nearby posts launched a counter-attack with heavy rocket fire, the intruders slit Talekar’s throat and left behind his decapitated body."
Lieutenant General Mehmood Ahmad, then the corps commander in Rawalpindi, visited Kashmiri's terrorist training camp in Kotli and appreciated his frequent guerrilla actions against the Indian Army.
His honeymoon with Pakistan's generals ended after the Jaish-e-Mohammad was created. Mehmood wanted Kashmiri to join the Jaish and accept Masood as his leader. But the one-eyed Kashmiri refused to do so. (He lost his eye in Afghan jehad against the Soviets).
The Jaish attacked his training camp in Kotli, but Kashmiri survived that assault. After 9/11, Musharraf banned Kashmiri's outfit.
He was arrested after an attempt on Musharraf's life in December 2003 and tortured during the interrogation.
The United Jihad Council led by Hizbul Mujahideen leader Syed Salahuddin strongly protested Kashmiri's arrest. In February 2004, Kashmiri was released, but was a shattered man. He disassociated himself from Kashmiri militants and remained silent for at least three years.
The Pakistan military's operation against the Lal Masjid in July 2007 totally changed Ilyas Kashmiri. He moved to North Waziristan where he had spent many years as an instructor in jihad against the Soviet army. This area was full of his friends and sympathisers. He reorganised his 313 brigade and joined hands with the Taliban.
Many former Pakistan army officers joined him. His 313 Brigade in North Waziristan numbered more than 3,000 fighters; most of them hailed from Punjab, Sindh and Pakistan occupied Kashmir.
According to Asia Times Online: An al-Qaeda-linked cell led by veteran Kashmiri guerrilla commander Ilyas Kashmiri had completed all plans for the assassination of Pakistan's chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kiani, in 2008, but when the matter was sent to the top al-Qaeda hierarchy for approval, it immediately ordered the plan to be shelved.
The points to ponder are these:
the direct connection of Pakistan commando with Al – Qaeda.
the direct connection of Pakistan Army with nuclear proliferation.
The direct connection of China in supplying nuclear material to Pakistan
The silence of US and NATO for their own gain
The impotence of India in all this!